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FISCAL AND TAX COMPETITIVENESSThe 2008/09 recession in Canada hammered government revenues and precipitated
extraordinary fiscal measures in response. Together, these forces caused the federal bottom
line to fall into massive deficits, breaking from a recent history of black ink. Future additions
to federal debt will erase the gains made from surpluses since 1996/97.  Restoring this balance
will be critical to the prospects of all Canadians and should be the focus of fiscal policy going
forward. 
In this year’s Shadow Budget we urge Ottawa to return to budgetary balance by fiscal year
2014/15. To ensure Canada’s international tax competitiveness position remains strong –
making Canada a more attractive place to invest when compared to its peers – this goal can
be achieved by reining in spending growth rather than increasing taxes. Sensible, fair, and
efficient measures for expenditure reduction include raising the employee share of federal
pension contributions from 32 to 50 percent, limiting growth in federal transfers to the
provinces beginning in 2014, and reducing subsidies to Crown corporations.    
Prudence, moreover, means seriously tackling deficits now, to avoid repeating the experience
of the 1980s and early 1990s, when compounding debt absorbed incremental revenues, and
kept the budget deep in the red. The 2010 Shadow Budget therefore offers areas for spending
reduction within a feasible short- and medium-term economic forecast, while developing an
environment for investment and innovation that positions our economy to better confront
the challenges of an aging population.  
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C
anada’s recession from late
2008 to mid-2009, and the
federal government’s fiscal
responses to it, have delivered a
massive setback to Ottawa’s bottom
line. The latest fiscal update (Canada
2009a) projects a $56 billion deficit 
for fiscal year 2009/10, followed by 
a $45 billion deficit in 2010/11. 
By adding more than $100 billion to net federal
debt, these deficits alone will effectively erase the
results of budget surpluses since 1996/97, and the
update’s projections show the debt rising by more
than $165 billion by 2014/15.
1This Shadow
Budget demonstrates how to limit the rise in federal
debt, by prudently reining in spending growth
rather than raising taxes, so that past and pending
improvements to the nation’s tax competitiveness
are not also erased.
Federal finances respond to ups and downs in the
Canadian economy, and even minor differences
between economic projections and actual events can
mean significant differences in fiscal outcomes. The
latest recession is no exception: the weaker than
expected economy means federal tax revenues will
likely fall short of expectations by nearly $20 billion
in 2009/10
2 – a gap equivalent to nearly four
percentage points in Goods and Services Tax (GST)
revenue. On the spending side, extraordinary fiscal
stimulus has come on top of an acceleration of
outlays, essentially across the board. The bottom-
line result is so burdensome that it is reasonable to
fear that later this decade, as demographically driven
spending pressures mount, Canada will risk falling
back into the compounding debt trap of the 1980s
and early 1990s. 
In this year’s Shadow Budget, we address two key
questions: How quickly should Ottawa return to
budgetary balance? Can this objective be met by
constraining spending rather than tax increases and,
if so, how? 
Our answer to the first question is emphatic: the
federal government needs a clear and achievable
plan to balance the budget in five years, by
2014/15. Several considerations reinforce this
conclusion.
This year, 2010, is the year in which the share of
Canada’s population in the traditional working-age
category – 18 to 64 – will peak. The move by more
of the population from working and saving to
retirement and drawing down wealth will subdue
growth in government revenue from payroll and
income taxes, while governments will face increasing
demand for seniors’ benefits and publicly funded
healthcare. Robson (2009) has estimated that the
discounted value of the increase in taxes needed to
meet demographically driven obligations over the
next half-century is $1.5 trillion.
Prudence, moreover, means seriously tackling
deficits now, to avoid repeating the experience of the
1980s and early 1990s, when compounding debt
absorbed incremental revenues, and kept the budget
deep in the red. The economic crisis has driven
interest rates to extraordinary lows. As monetary
policy tightens, short-term interest rates will rise
toward historic norms. At least as important,
government debt – which in the depths of the crisis
was in tremendous demand from safe-haven
investors – is burgeoning. The sobering fiscal
situations of many governments, most notably the
United States, will raise fears of inflation, or even
default in some cases, among investors. For these
reasons, long-term interest rates are also likely to rise
– perhaps sharply – in the next few years. An
interest rate rise of one percentage point above the
government’s baseline fiscal projections in 2011
would add about $9 billion to federal debt charges
by 2015. The sooner Ottawa stops borrowing and
starts repaying, the better it can weather bad news
on that front.
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The authors wish to thank the members of the C.D. Howe Institute’s Fiscal and Tax Competitiveness Council for their useful comments.
1 For the sake of presenting numbers consistent with those in official documents, we do not restate Ottawa’s financial results here, but we do note
that fair value accounting for federal pension obligations (Laurin and Robson 2009) would add almost $60 billion to the net debt as of March
31, 2009, and would have revealed deficits in many years during the past decade.
2 Difference between federal tax revenues projection in the 2009 fiscal update to that of the 2008 federal budget, adjusted to take into account tax
measures announced in the 2009 federal budget.| 2 Backgrounder 127
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Another consideration is political and event risk.
Over a planning period of six years, economic and
other surprises are likely to trigger new program
spending increases or revenue cuts. For example,
net Employment Insurance (EI) program revenues
make a major contribution to the baseline
projections of the federal budget balance. Under
existing rules, the Canadian Employment Insurance
Financing Board must increase EI premiums to
eliminate any excess of EI benefits over premiums
accumulated since 2009.
3 Yet the annual EI
surpluses Ottawa is counting on to bolster its
bottom line will more than replenish the recent
accumulation of excess benefits over premiums, at
which time the government will face considerable
pressure to let premiums decline. Such
considerations make desirable a measure of
prudence in the projections of EI surpluses.
On the expenditure side, the federal government
expects nearly $20 billion of stimulus spending to
expire within the next two years, and also expects
that underlying program spending will grow more
slowly than the economy and more slowly than in
recent history. Such firm control over program
spending over such a long period cannot be taken
for granted.
Finally, fiscal planning for the next decade must
recognize, as previous budgets have not, that
economic expansions wax and wane. A reasonable
objective, given the size of the deficit, would be to
resume paying down the debt before the next
slowdown. The average business cycle length – less
than six years
4 – takes us to fiscal year 2014/15. 
Turning to the second question of choosing
spending restraint or tax increases, deficit
elimination should not compromise Canada’s
emerging position as a country with growth-
friendly and internationally competitive tax rates.
Governments in previous budgets have shown a
continuous commitment to lower Canadians’ tax
burden through various rate reductions (see Figure
1). Some of those reductions, such as the decline in
the general corporate income tax rate to 15 percent
by 2012, promise major gains in economic
performance. This shadow budget aims to keep
taxes low and internationally competitive.
Returning to balanced budgets will require
rigorous spending restraint on the part of the
government. It can be done, however: the pages
that follow identify expenditure reduction measures
whose attractiveness is based on cost, effectiveness,
and equity considerations.
The Size of the Challenge Ahead:
Outlook for Program Spending
With the economy now in recovery, stimulus
spending must give way to containing expenditure
growth. In this section, we estimate the size of the
challenge ahead based on reasonable long-term
economic assumptions.
1. Prudent Economic and Revenue Projections
The baseline forecast for this budget assumes that
the economy will expand at a pace consistent with
historical average labour productivity growth,
demographic projections and GDP inflation
running at 2 percent per year (Table 1). Because
aging significantly depresses the share of the
economically active population in our model,
5 our
forecasts for economic growth rates are lower than
those from the Parliamentary Budget Office and
the Department of Finance’s most recent survey of
private forecasters, notably toward the end of the
planning period.
6 Allowing for the down as well as
the up phase of the business cycle, we believe our
approach is consistent with fiscal prudence in the
medium and longer term. 
3 Excluding $2.9 billion of benefit enhancements announced in Budget 2009 that Ottawa has committed not to count among the funds to be
replenished in future years. 
4 As measured by the average length of the last 11 US business cycles (National Bureau of Economic Research 2009). Cross (1996) shows Canadian
business cycles roughly mimicking US cycles.
5 With total fertility rates fixed at 2007 levels throughout the projection period, our demographic model assumes that trends in life expectancy and
international migration continue at recent six-year historical averages. Under these assumptions, our model predicts that the expansion of the
workforce will rely more heavily on immigration than in the past as babyboomers begin to exit the labour force over the next decade. 
6 We assume the economy will reach its long term potential growth by 2015, at which point the economy will have caught up to its potential level of output.Backgrounder 127 | 3
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Table 1: Economic Assumptions and Revenue Projections









































Figure 1: Declining Marginal Effective Tax Rates on Capital Canada, Industry Aggregate
Source: Chen and Mintz (2006, 2009).
2009 2010 to 2015




2009, Tables 2 and 5.
Productivity growth per hours of work continuing at its 20-year
historical average; labour supply per capita decreasing according to
demographic projections but adjusted to reflect a rebound of
employment; GDP inflation assumed at 2 percent per year. Federal tax
revenues and EI premium revenues are derived from Department of
Finance’s projected revenues as a share of GDP. Other federal revenues
are as projected in the Update of Economic and Fiscal Projections
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Economic Growth (%)
Real GDP growth -2.3 2.8 3.1 3.1 2.5 2.4 2.0
GDP inflation -2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Nominal GDP growth -4.6 4.8 5.1 5.1 4.5 4.4 4.0
Federal Revenue Projections ($ billion)
Taxation Revenues 176.5 190.4 202.5 213.8 224.9 236.4 245.9
EI Premiums 16.4 17.3 19.5 22.0 24.5 25.8 24.4
Other Federal Revenues 23.9 26.9 30.1 33.0 33.5 32.7 33.0
Total Revenues 216.8 234.6 252.1 268.8 282.9 294.8 303.3| 4 Backgrounder 127
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Presuming no change to the tax structure, budge-
tary revenues would stand at about $303 billion by
2015/16, or 15.2 percent of GDP (Table 1).
Notwithstanding our reservations expressed above, EI
premium revenues are assumed to grow at a healthy
pace, following federal projections and consistent
with premium rate hikes legislatively mandated.
2. Revenue Implications for Program Spending
Given this path for revenue – and assuming
transfers to provinces, territories and persons grow
as projected in the fiscal update – what path for
program spending would yield balance in 2014/15
and surplus in 2015/16? Direct program expenses
7
– excluding temporary stimulus spending – would
need to grow by only 1.9 percent per year on
average for the next six years (Table 2).
7 Direct program expenditures are expenses associated with programs directly delivered by the federal government. More than 60 percent of direct
spending is composed of the operating expenses of the federal government – such as the cost of public servant’s compensation, national defence,
food inspection, the Coast Guard, the federal court system, the operation of health facilities for natives and veterans, and the national parks system
– more than 30 percent is made up of various grants and contributions administered by departments, and less than 10 percent is made up of
amounts appropriated to Crown corporations (proportions based on fiscal year 2008/09). 
2009/10 2015/16
Direct Program Expenses ($billion) 120.7 114.9
Minus temporary stimulus expenses -18.7 -0.6
Underlying Expenses 102.0 114.3
Projected Required Annual Average Growth Rate (%)
of Underlying Direct Program Expenses (2009/10 to 2015/16)
Nominal 1.9
Per capita 1.0
Inflation-adjusted per capita -1.0
Table 2: Path of Direct Program Spending Required to Bring the Federal Budget Back to Surplus by 2015/16
Source: Authors’ calculations as described in text.
Average Growth Rate End-of-Cycle Level
(%) (2008 constant $)
Projected Required Path
2009/10* to 2015/16 -1.0 2,927
Shadow Budget Proposed Path
2009/10* to 2015/16 -0.5 3,023
Previous Business Cycles
2001/02 to 2009/10* 3.3 3,104
1992/93 to 2001/02 -1.0 2,397
1983/84 to 1992/93 -1.2 2,615
Table 3: Real Per Capita Direct Program Expenses Past and Projected
*Excluding temporary stimulus spending
Source: Authors’ calculations as described in text.From one perspective, this is not a tremendously
ambitious goal: similar declines have occurred
before. The level of spending required by 2015/16
would, after adjustment for inflation and
population growth, still exceed the marks set at the
end of two of the last three business cycles (Table
3), and would be roughly equivalent to its 2008/09
level. From another perspective, however, it is a
challenge: it means real per capita direct program
spending decreasing 1.0 percent a year on average
from its current level.
The recommendations in this Shadow Budget
would take real per capita direct spending down by
about half of the required amount, leaving direct
program expenses at the same share of GDP they
represented in 2002 (Figure 2). The bulk of the
remaining required savings comes from cuts in tax
expenditures and provincial/territorial transfers. A
shift in debt management that reduces expected
debt charges rounds out the recommended
improvements to the budget balance.
Priorities for the 2010 Federal Budget
As noted at the outset, a planning period of six years
is long enough that a measure of prudence seems
sensible to allow for events that may trigger new
spending or lower revenues. For this reason, we aim
for a budgetary surplus of nearly $5 billion at the
end of the period and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 30
percent – five percentage points above the pre-
recession target of 25 percent, but down from its
peak of 35 percent in 2010/11 (Table 4 on page 14). 
1. Measures to Restrict Direct Spending
EXPENDITURE REVIEW AND REALLOCATION:The
spending restraint of the mid-1990s, so critical in
restoring federal fiscal health, required careful
prioritizing. The reviews scaled back federal
obligations, not only in high-profile areas such as
EI and transfers to the provinces, but also in areas
such as Crown corporation subsidies and the
government’s own operating expenditures. 
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 







































(excluding the effect of temporary
stimulus spending)
Figure 2: Direct Federal Program Expenses as a Percentage of GDP
Sources: Canada (2009a) and authors’ calculations.| 6 Backgrounder 127
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A similar expenditure review and reallocation, of
all aspects of government expenditures, operating
and capital outlays alike, is now needed.
Government programs, grants and contributions
need scrutiny against a set of familiar questions:
8
￿ Is there a legitimate and necessary role for
government in this program area or activity, or
could the private and voluntary sectors play a
greater role?
￿ Does the initiative give Canadians value for
their tax dollars? Have options for achieving
lower delivery costs – through, for example,
technology, public-private partnership or third-
party delivery – been properly exploited?
￿ Is the federal government acting within its well-
known constitutional responsibilities? Is there
overlap and duplication with another order of
government, and is the program a candidate for
realignment with the provinces?
A rigorous evaluation of federal activity, according
to the above criteria, can restrain growth in
program spending.
9 It is important, however, to be
realistic about the available gains. While
expenditure reviews in 2005 and 2006 identified
nearly $12 billion of cumulative savings over five
years, most of these were to be realized through
efficiency gains, which are difficult to calculate and
verify, and overall, federal spending accelerated
during this period. Recognizing that expenditure
reviews tend to be implemented incompletely, we
target savings that grow incrementally from about
0.25 percent of overall direct spending in the first
year to reach about 1.2 percent in the sixth year (see
above).
RESTRAINING FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYMENT:
The number of federal public servants has grown
rapidly in the last 10 years. Growth of federal
employment,
10 excluding military personnel,
exceeded general population growth by nearly 3
percent a year on average from 1999 to 2008. 
The federal government should scale back
employment by about 0.7 percent per year for the
next six years, which would return it, relative to
total population, to its average level of the last 10
years. Ideally, this would be accomplished by merit-
based considerations. Because federal workforce
management is currently seriously constrained by
practices that reflect its non-market setting,
however, attrition will inevitably be the principal
means for realizing this reduction. We note that
data from the Public Service pension plan suggests
that nearly 20 percent of current plan contributors
are nearing retirement.
11 If the government were
simply to eliminate one of every five positions that
become open through retirement, it would achieve
the reduction we recommend (see below).
8 See, for example, the federal spending review announced in December 2003 with the creation of an Expenditure Review Committee. 
9 Parliament, which reviews and annually authorizes about one third of federal (non-statutory) spending plans, has a complementary oversight role
in prioritizing spending.
10 Federal employees common to Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Public Service Commission of Canada and Statistics Canada statistical universes.
11 About 17 percent of federal Public Service pension plan contributors have more than 25 years of service. 
Estimated Annual Cost Savings ($ million)
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Expenditure review and reallocation 250 500 750 1,000 1,250 1,500
Estimated Annual Cost Savings ($ million)
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Containing federal government employment 237 489 755 1,036 1,333 1,647Backgrounder 127 | 7
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REDUCINGTHE CURRENT SERVICE COST OF
DEFERRED COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS:The
federal government has many deferred compensation
arrangements for its employees, including health and
pension benefits. On the pension front, the largest
obligations are for the Public Service (PS), Canadian
Forces (CF) and Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP) pension plans. At their inception decades
ago, these plans were completely unfunded; since
2000, employees’ and government contributions have
been invested and managed independently by the
Public Sector Pension Investment Board. In the early
2000s, government (employer) contributions covered
nearly 75 percent of the current service cost of new
benefit accruals. With employee contributions
growing more rapidly than government contribu-
tions, this ratio is now reduced to about 68 percent,
and the latest triennial actuarial reports for the PS,
CF, and RCMP pension plans together are expecting
that this ratio will continue to decline to about 64
percent in 2015 due to planned legislated employee
contribution rate increases.
We think that the federal share of the current
service cost of new pension accruals should shrink
further. Contributions to most public-sector
pension plans, including in Ontario, Québec, and
Alberta, are shared more evenly, with about 50
percent from the employer and 50 percent from
employees. The public-service pension plans in
British Columbia and New Brunswick, along with
the Ontario hospitals pension plan, have similar
contribution ratios, with employers covering 55
percent of the cost of contributions. The Ontario
Teachers’ Pension Plan and the Ontario Municipal
Employees Retirement System (OMERS) both
have equally shared contributions.
One method to increase the portion of the cost
borne by employees would be simply to further
raise their contribution rates. Another method,
which might be more acceptable to the employees if
it reduced the contributions they would otherwise
have to pay, would be to lower the total cost of
these plans by amending their benefits, which offer
federal employees far richer retirements than their
private-sector counterparts.
12
In particular, these plans contain early retirement
provisions resulting in members spending, on
average, more time in retirement than working and
contributing to the plan. Over the past three years,
members of the PS pension plan – the largest of all
– retired from the public service at age 58 on
average. After contributing for 26 years, they are
expected to draw on their pensions for another 27
years – or a few years longer, factoring in survivors’
benefits. Members of the RCMP and CF pension
plans retired at 54 and 48 on average with,
respectively, 31 years of service for 32 in retirement,
and 25 years of service for 39 in retirement. Any
change contributing to a greater average length of
service would have a significant impact on the
financial position of these plans.
Another alternative would be to adopt some
hybrid pension-plan features, resulting in a different
risk-sharing formula between the employer and
employees. Whatever the route chosen, the objective
is to gradually even out the employer and employee
portions of the current-service cost of federal pension
plans, resulting in a contribution ratio of about
50/50, similar to that of most other public-service
pension plans in Canada (see below).
12 A fair-value approach to these plans puts the value of benefits accrued in 2008/09 at some 34 percent of covered pay for the Public Service Plan,
and about 41 percent of pay for the RCMP and Canadian Forces Plans (Laurin and Robson 2009). By contrast, in the case of individuals saving on
their own, the Income Tax Act prevents them from putting more than 18 percent of earnings or $22,000 into an RRSP, whichever is the lowest.
Estimated Annual Cost Savings ($ million)
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Gradually equalizing employer/employee cost sharing 
of PS, RCMP and CF pension plans 103 208 312 486 676 882| 8 Backgrounder 127
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STABILIZINGTHE GROWTH OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
SPENDING: Since 2000, spending on Canada’s
military has grown by about 8 percent annually, or
nearly three percentage points faster than other direct
government spending. These rapid increases were
necessary to arrest the decline in Canada’s military
capability, and to better equip our armed forces for
their role in an unstable world.
Efficiencies are available in this area. The extensive
use of reservists, for example, has allowed the
Canadian Forces to leverage core resources. As Busby
(2010) has shown, a modest investment of $8
million annually could make Canada’s reliance on
reservists more robust, by supporting their
employment in civilian life.
Importantly, the end of Canada’s military
presence in Afghanistan, planned for 2011, will
generate sizable cost savings to be reallocated to
other military purposes. The Parliamentary Budget
Officer estimated the annual operating cost of
Canada’s armed forces in Afghanistan at about $1.5
billion (PBO 2008).
13
The reallocation of cost savings from the with-
drawal of our troops from Afghanistan creates an
opportunity to limit the expansion of spending on
National Defence without lowering our military
capacity. Therefore, growth in military spending
should be constrained to a rate not exceeding infla-
tion plus population growth for the next six years
(see above).
SUBSIDIESTO CROWN CORPORATIONS: Subsidies to
Crown corporations have grown rapidly in recent
years, spurred more recently by measures to cushion
the recession. Yet the distinguishing feature of
Crown corporations as opposed to government
departments is that they operate in a commercial
environment, which should imply consistent
attention to the bottom line. This shadow budget
therefore proposes to gradually reduce subsidies to
Crown corporations from their currently planned
level by 5 percent in the first year to reach 10
percent in five years (see below).
2. Review of Tax Expenditures
The tax system is used by the federal and provincial
governments to attain various economic and social
objectives. These objectives are achieved through a
number of tax measures – such as exemptions,
deductions, rebates, deferrals or credits – that are
generally referred to as tax expenditures, because they
represent a cost to the treasury by reducing
government revenues. In the Finance Canada
assessment of tax expenditures, more than 170 federal
tax measures are listed, with the amount of foregone
revenues ostensibly exceeding more than a third of
the total value of all taxes collected (Canada 2009b).
Using the tax system in this way is fraught with
problems that distort taxpayer choices and
compromise its core revenue-raising function. Tax
preferences make the system more complex,
sometimes facilitating and often encouraging tax
avoidance, and raising compliance costs for both
taxpayers and tax collectors. Preferences directed at
particular sectors, industries or activities – such as
13 For fiscal year 2007/08. 
Estimated Annual Cost Savings ($ million)
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Military spending grows in line with its current
real per capita level  492 966 1,363 1,504 1,567 1,633
Estimated Annual Cost Savings ($ million)
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Reducing subsidies to crown corporations  380 456 532 608 684 760Backgrounder 127 | 9
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accelerated depreciation for manufacturing and
processing, the Atlantic Investment Tax Credit or
the small business tax deduction – shift resources
away from more efficient uses and locations (Chen
and Mintz 2009). 
On the personal side, tax preferences designed to
encourage activities deemed socially desirable –
examples include the First-Time Home Buyers’ Tax
Credit, the Home Renovation Tax Credit, the Public
Transit Tax Credit, or the Children’s Fitness Tax
Credit – inevitably subsidize people who would do
these things anyway. Narrowly targeted tax incentives
may also result in price increases from suppliers,
thereby reducing the benefit of the tax incentive for
those to whom it was directed and undermining its
effectiveness (Chen and Mintz 2009).
An incentive with well-documented flaws is the
federal credit for investment in labour-sponsored
venture capital corporations (LSVCC). This tax
subsidy has lured retail investors’ money into
numerous ventures across Canada, resulting in
individuals with relatively modest wealth and small
investment portfolios investing a portion of their
retirement funds in very risky securities. Also,
outside Quebec and providing that a minimum
holding period has been met, these venture capital
funds are as liquid as many mutual funds, compel-
ling LSVCCs to retain a relatively sizable portion of
their investments in more liquid instruments to
meet expected withdrawals. LSVCCs have become
a dominant source of venture capital in Canada,
likely crowding out private venture investment
(Cumming 2007). The fact that they would likely
not survive in the absence of the tax credits is
evidence that these resources are likely not routed
to their best uses.
Because governments can use either tax measures
or program spending to achieve their public policy
goals, the cost of tax measures should be assessed in
light of the cost of alternative programs that might
achieve the same objective. For example, the
complete elimination of tax expenditures
mentioned above would have yielded more than
$4 billion of additional tax revenue in 2009. This
shadow budget urges a rigorous and ambitious
review of all tax expenditures to identify and
rapidly phase out those failing the tests of economic
efficiency and cost effectiveness (see above).
3. Limiting Growth in Federal Transfers to
Provincial/Territorial Governments 
In 2008/09, major federal transfers to the provinces
and territories in support of health and social
programs exceeded $33 billion: federal taxes thus
funded about a quarter of the provincial/territorial
cost of delivering the services these transfers are
intended to help finance. This overlap creates
confusion over who is responsible for funding and
delivering public services, making it difficult to
identify which government is responsible when
taxes exceed, or programs fall short of, voters’
expectations. Stress within the federation would be
reduced, and political accountability for public-
service delivery increased, if Canadians paid more
of their taxes to the level of government that spends
them on delivering the services voters want and
need (Poschmann and Tapp 2005). The simplest
way to do so is for the federal government to tax
voters less and transfer less to the other
jurisdictions.
A previous federal budget lowered the GST by
two percentage points, creating room for provinces
to raise the taxes of their choosing to suit regional
preferences and spending needs. Such change at the
provincial level should entail a shift to
consumption-based, value-added taxes such as the
HST, and away from antiquated retail sales taxes,
with transitional financial support from Ottawa.
Three Atlantic provinces have made this shift, and
Ontario and British Columbia plan to do so by
mid-2010. However, as provinces take on more
responsibility for financing activities in areas that
are their constitutional responsibility, federal
transfers should shrink in relative terms. 
Estimated Annual Cost Savings ($ million)
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Review of tax expenditures  600 900 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,500| 10 Backgrounder 127
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Federal transfers to the provinces and territories in
support of health and social programs are set in
current federal legislation through 2013/14,
following federal-provincial negotiations. This
shadow budget therefore proposes to freeze major
federal-provincial transfers in support of health and
social programs at their 2013/14 levels for five
years, after federal-provincial accords and current
legislation expire. This will provide the federal
government more fiscal room for tax relief,
explicitly leaving tax room available for provincial/
territorial governments to occupy (see above).
4. Better Debt Management 
The joint commitment by Parliament and the Bank
of Canada to hold consumer price index inflation
at 2 percent, which has successfully delivered low
and stable inflation since the mid-1990s, creates an
important opportunity to reduce the federal
government’s interest costs in the short term and
protect them from increases in the longer term.
Alongside its ordinary debt securities, Ottawa issues
“real return” bonds (RRBs), which promise
repayment of their principal with adjustment for
increases in the price index. Because these bonds
protect investors from inflation, their yield is lower
than the yield on ordinary bonds, which do not.
Yet the difference between the yield on RRBs and
the higher yield on nominal-return bonds, which
would be close to 2 percent if the markets for the
two bonds were similar and commitment to the
inflation target were fully credible, is typically larger
than that. It averaged 2.36 percent from 2001 to
2007, and after dipping during the crisis, widened
to 2.55 percent at the end of 2009. 
One frequently cited reason for the spread being
wider than 2 percent is that the yield on RRBs is
low because their supply is so small relative to the
demand for them. RRBs are an excellent
investment for pension funds and retirement savers
generally, and the roughly $34 billion of them that
are outstanding are mostly in the hands of these
long-term investors. By satisfying more of this
demand, Ottawa could save on interest costs,
thereby funding its debt more cheaply than
through issuing higher-yield nominal-return bonds.
Another critical reason for the spread being wider
than 2 percent is that the commitment to 2 percent
inflation is not perfectly credible. Investors in
ordinary nominal-return bonds demand more than
just compensation for the 2 percent inflation that
the government and the Bank of Canada have
promised. They also want an extra premium for
insurance against the possibility that inflation ends
up being higher than 2 percent. This premium
presents an additional opportunity for a
government truly committed to containing
inflation. Ottawa could make its commitment to
lower inflation more credible by issuing more debt
that it cannot debase through surprise inflation. In
so doing, it could reduce the interest rate it would
otherwise have to pay on nominal-return bonds.
AN EXPANDED RRB PROGRAM: ESTIMATINGTHE
INTEREST SAVINGS:In each of the past two years,
Ottawa issued $2.2 billion in RRBs. This Shadow
Budget proposes an aggressive expansion of this
program, increasing the issue of RRBs to $10 billion
annually in each of the next six years – a pace
sufficient to ensure that the share of RRBs in total
bonds outstanding grows, despite the massive amount
of borrowing Ottawa will undertake in the near term.
We estimate two types of interest saving from an an
enhanced issue of RRBs:.
(i) To begin with, it straightforwardly lowers the cost
of servicing new debt. At the recent spread of 2.55
between the two types of bonds, the saving from
lower interest payments would exceed the cost of
indexing the principal of the RRBs by an amount
averaging some $200 million in the latter half of
the projection period.
(ii)   The second source of saving arises from the
additional credibility for the inflation target this
aggressive program of RRB issuance would
provide – the government is, in effect, putting its
Estimated Annual Cost Savings ($ million)
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Limiting growth in federal transfers to provinces and territories  0 0 0 0 1,146 2,369Backgrounder 127 | 11
money where its mouth is. Our estimates here are
necessarily more speculative: in the short run, the
impact on nominal bond yields of enhanced
credibility for the government’s inflation target
would probably be marginal. However, over time
– especially as fears that the United States will
monetize its unsustainable public debts push
bond yields up south of the border – we anticipate
that the impact would grow. In our projections,
we allow for a yield benefit to the government,
evident on all nominal-return bonds, of five basis
points in the first year, increasing five basis points
per year until it amounts to 30 basis points (over
one-quarter of one percent) by 2015. Because new
debt issuance to finance projected deficits and the
stock of bonds maturing every year is relatively
large, the interest saving even from this modest
effect would be substantial.
If this second effect were to occur, the net impact of
the lower yield on RRBs themselves relative to their
nominal counterparts would be smaller. The
combined interest saving from the more aggressive
RRB issuance program, after netting out the
relevant interest saving from replacing nominal-
return bonds with RRBs, is shown above.
5. Tax Initiatives
CHANGESTOTHE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT FOR
PENSION PLANS: A scan of recent governmental
reviews, the 2009 federal discussion paper (Canada
2009c), and recent pension-related initiatives reveals
the large extent to which defined-benefit (DB)
pension plans preoccupy policymakers. Their
decline in the private sector is an area of concern for
many, and their recent troubles have prompted
accommodation in funding requirements and some
outright bailouts. Policy toward defined-
contribution (DC) plans or Registered Retirement
Savings Plans (RRSPs) has been less supportive,
worsening their problems and inhibiting their
improvement. We need to improve the policy
environment around DC/RRSP savings to facilitate
the private- sector development of new
employer/employee risk-sharing formulas that help
to solve challenges faced by both DC and DB plans. 
This budget proposes to adopt key changes to the
Income Tax Act with respect to DC/RRSP
arrangements found in Robson (2010). Among the
list of recommendations would be to provide more
tax-deferral room for DC/RRSP savers. Using the
federal Public Service Plan as a benchmark would
suggest that the maximum percentage of income
should be 34 percent (Laurin and Robson 2009, 3);
a proportional rise in the dollar limit would bring it
to $42,000. Also, the age at which people lose access
to tax-deferred saving and must start decumulating
should rise from 71 – say to 73. Further, once savers
have moved into the decumulation phase, with
Registered Retirement Income funds (RRIFs) or
Life Income Funds (LIFs) the pension credit should
apply regardless of age. They should also have the
same spousal income-splitting opportunities as
registered plan members. Another step would be to
alleviate the tax disadvantages of group RRSPs by (i)
letting sponsors and/or participants deduct some
administrative expenses currently levied against plan
assets from outside income, and (ii) removing
federal payroll taxes from employer contributions.
As for mandatory rapid drawdowns from RRIFs
and LIFs, current rules can force people to deplete
their assets too quickly, which points to the need to
revisit the current formula or simply abolish these
rules.
Of all of these initiatives, raising the annual tax-
deferred contribution limit would be the most costly.
However, on a present value basis, the cost of this
measure is small: it mainly affects the timing of
federal revenue. Overall, the cost of these measures is
small, and can be phased in or out at different rates.
REFORMING CORPORATE GROUPTAXATION:
Canada’s approach to corporate group taxation
gives rise to a number of problems, including
higher administrative and transaction costs,
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
Estimated Annual Cost Savings ($ million)
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Better debt management  74 179 293 400 499 578| 12 Backgrounder 127
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unfairness among different types of corporations,
uncertainty, and weakened international
competitiveness. Also, the web of intragroup
transactions and structural changes needed to
achieve some degree of tax consolidation adds
complexity and artificiality to the tax system and
the business environment since the sole purpose for
these business activities is to gain a tax advantage.
These concerns point to the need for the
introduction a comprehensive federal-provincial
statutory framework allowing for the transfer of
profits and losses among domestic members of a
corporate group for federal and provincial tax
purposes (Laurin 2009). This proposed group-
taxation regime would increase the ability of firms
to use tax losses and use them more quickly,
thereby reducing the economic costs associated
with partial loss refundability. This budget proposes
a study of potential group taxation regimes which,
if implemented, would bring the Canadian tax base
in line with international norms.
MODERNIZING CANADA’S SYSTEM OF
INTERNATIONALTAXATION: Canada’s approach to
taxing active business income of foreign affiliates of
Canadian corporations allows those affiliates to
repatriate earnings on a tax-exempt basis if the
foreign affiliate is resident in a jurisdiction with
which Canada has a tax treaty or, since 2008, if
Canada and the host jurisdiction have announced
negotiations to establish a Tax Information
Exchange Agreement (TIEA). However, many
Canadian corporations invest in foreign affiliates
that earn active business income in jurisdictions
with which Canada has no tax treaty, nor
negotiations respecting a TIEA, nor any reasonable
prospect of doing so in the near future. Earnings of
Canadian corporations could be more readily
reinvested at home and abroad, if the exemption
system were extended to cover all active business
income of controlled foreign affiliates, irrespective
of the existence of a tax treaty or negotiations to
establish a TIEA. The domestic revenue impact of
such an approach would be small.
IMPROVING FUELTAX ACCOUNTABILITY: There
exists an elaborate mechanism for distributing
federal fuel taxes to municipalities in support of
infrastructure spending. While municipalities
benefit from access to a broader range of revenue
sources (Kitchen 2006), this mechanism disconnects
the flow of funds from political accountability for
setting tax rates. Matching revenue raising authority
and spending responsibility is at the core of
responsible governance and accountable govern-
ment. This goal will be better achieved by lowering
the federal fuel tax in provinces that agree to design
their own mechanisms for delivering fuel tax
revenues to the jurisdictions in which they were
raised. This measure will be cost neutral.
OTHERTAX INITIATIVES SHOULDTHEY BECOME
AFFORDABLE: As economic outcomes improve, debt
repayment may be accelerated, and tax initiatives
that would otherwise await the development of
larger surpluses could be brought forward. Revenue
changes that promise important economic gains
appear in Box 1.
Pulling It Together
This shadow budget has proposed a suite of
expenditure reduction measures aimed at
restraining government spending growth and
balancing the budget within five years, at a pace
consistent with Canadians’ long-term capacity to
pay taxes at internationally competitive rates. Given
the longer-term horizon of budget planning, these
proposals are enacted against a relatively prudent
fiscal framework. The focus of this shadow budget
has been to restore federal fiscal sustainability;
however, a surplus will emerge by the end of the
fiscal projection period, enabling the federal debt-
to-GDP ratio to fall back to its 2008/09 level
(Table 4). As fiscal room grows, future budgets will
contemplate reducing federal debt and enacting
other initiatives, such as those proposed in Box 1.
This Shadow Budget will bring the federal
budget framework into line with the needs of an
economy challenged by population aging as a
shrinking labour force is asked to pay for the
services of a growing portion of the population.
Restoring fiscal health will provide the flexibility
necessary to enable Canadian competitiveness to
thrive, and help Canadians save and invest for
future prosperity.Backgrounder 127 | 13
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Extending the basic personal amount to all
individual investors: While Canadian individual
investors benefit from a basic personal exemption
that shields income below $10,382 from taxation,
individual foreign investors receive no such
benefit. Other countries such as the United States
and the United Kingdom do exempt income
below a low threshold from taxation, which
makes partnership and other ventures for
international investors more attractive, and spares
a good deal of administrative expense. This
budget proposes to extend the basic personal
amount to all individual investors.
Elimination of withholding taxes on cross-border
dividend payments: Canada generally levies a
withholding tax on cross-border dividend
payments. A 15 percent withholding tax apply on
portfolio investments paid to residents of the
United States and other tax treaty nations and a 5
percent rate applies on foreign direct investments
where foreign dividend recipients own 10 percent
or more of a Canadian company’s voting shares.
Recent amendments to the Income Tax Act and
the Canada-US Income Tax Convention
effectively eliminated withholding taxes on all
interest payments made to US investors and on
arm’s length interest payments made to all
investors, regardless of their country of residence.
New US tax treaty agreements signed with its
main trading partners provide that cross-border
dividends paid by a subsidiary to its parent
company are completely exempt from
withholding taxes, while rates on portfolio
dividends have been reduced (Laurin 2007). This
budget proposes to initiate treaty negotiations
with the United States to provide for the
reciprocal elimination of withholding taxes on all
cross-border dividend payments. The elimination
of withholding taxes on dividends and interest
would result in an increase in capital investment
in Canada of approximately $28 billion, and an
increase in income of more than $7.5 billion
annually (Mintz 2001).
Extending the Dividend Tax Credit: Many current
or soon-to-be retirees have suffered from the
financial crisis, and sponsors of defined-benefit
pensions face pressure to fund their plans with
cash they could otherwise use to pay workers and
suppliers, and make capital investments. The
existing dividend tax credit (DTC) provides relief
for taxable investors receiving dividends when the
business has paid tax prior to distribution, but
dividends paid into retirement saving plans get
no equivalent relief. Extending the DTC to
retirement savings plans receiving dividends from
tax-paying businesses will alleviate some need 
for new saving by individuals and plan sponsors
in the short run, and remove a distortion in
Canada’s tax system in the long run. 
Eliminating Regionally Extended Employment
Insurance Benefits:The EI program is built around
a multitude of policy objectives. Regional income
support goals are blended into the regular benefit
program, significantly weakening the program’s
ability to perform its original function: insurance
against involuntary, temporary and unanticipated
loss of income. Adopting uniform entrance
requirements and uniform benefit durations
would eliminate the unfairness inherent in the
provision of benefits based on regional unem-
ployment rates (Busby et al. 2009). Reforms must
also not encourage the further development of
seasonal employment patterns that tend to couple
with EI benefits. Modulating the new, universal
benefit standards with the national unemploy-
ment rate should help remedy this problem.
Regionally extended benefits, intended to
supplement the income of workers in regions
affected by structural unemployment, reinforce
the persistence of unemployment and reduce
economic incentives to adjust to labour-market
conditions. They should be left outside of the 
EI program, and dealt with by other means, such
as federal or provincial transfers funded by
general revenue.
Box 1: A Short List of Tax Initiatives Should They Become Affordable| 14 Backgrounder 127
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Taxation Revenues 191.6 176.5 190.4 202.5 213.8 224.9 236.4 245.9
EI premiums 16.9 16.4 17.3 19.5 22.0 24.5 25.8 24.4
Other revenues 24.6 23.9 26.9 30.1 33.0 33.5 32.7 33.0
Total Revenues 233.1 216.8 234.6 252.1 268.8 282.9 294.8 303.3
Projected Expenses based on Latest Fiscal Update
Direct program expenses 99.7 120.7 117.2 113.5 117.4 120.0 122.3 124.6
Transfers to persons 61.6 69.5 71.4 71.0 72.5 74.3 76.8 79.1
EI benefits 16.3 22.1 22.0 19.2 18.4 17.6 17.9 17.9
Other personal benefits 45.3 47.4 49.4 51.8 54.1 56.7 58.9 61.2
Transfers to other levels 46.5 51.8 56.0 56.1 56.9 59.7 62.3 65.0
Gross debt charges 31.0 30.7 33.7 37.6 41.0 41.9 41.9 42.5
Total expenditures 238.8 272.7 278.3 278.2 287.8 295.9 303.3 311.2
Budgetary Balance 
before Initiatives -5.8 -55.9 -43.7 -26.0 -19.0 -13.0 -8.4 -7.9
Initiatives:
Expenditure review and reallocation -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -1 -1.3 -1.5
Containing federal government employment -0.2 -0.5 -0.8 -1.0 -1.3 -1.6
Gradually equalizing employer/employee cost 
sharing of PS, RCMP and CF pension plans -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.9
Military spending grows in line with its 
current real per capita level  -0.5 -1.0 -1.4 -1.5 -1.6 -1.6
Reducing subsidies to crown corporations  -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8
Review of tax expenditures  -0.6 -0.9 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.5
Better debt management -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6
Limiting growth in federal transfers to   
provinces and territories  -1.1 -2.4
Change to debt charges -0.1 -0.4 -0.8 -1.3 -1.9
New Budgetary Balance -5.8 -55.9 -41.5 -22.2 -13.4 -5.9 1.2 4.8
Accumulated Deficit 463.7 519.6 561.1 583.3 596.7 602.6 601.5 596.6
Debt-to-GDP Ratio (percent) 29 34 35 35 34 33 31 30
Table 4: Summary of Measures and Fiscal Projections
Sources: Canada (2009a) and authors’ calculations.References
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